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I. INTRODUCTION
To have a $320,000 house, a Jaquar XJ-S, a Cadillac, a Jeep, and a job
which pays $100,000 a year defines a widespread perception of the Ameri-
can dream. This also describes, in part, one debtor's recent "fresh start"
following bankruptcy, wherein he was permitted to retain all this property
free from pre-bankruptcy creditor's claims.' The fresh start concept, which
allows a debtor to exempt enough property to begin life anew after bank-
ruptcy, is based on a consensus that this is preferable to creating a class of at
least temporary wards of the state.2 This was one of the primary considera-
tions that motivated enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(1978 Code).3 Although the above described property it not typical of the
assets retained by most bankrupts, the case exemplifies the tremendous im-
* Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish, Kansas City, Missouri.
** Associate, Polsinelli, White & Vardeman, Kansas City, Missouri.
*** Associate, Linde Thomson Fairchild Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke,
Kansas City, Missouri.
1. See Coing Under in Style, KANSAS CITY MAGAZINE, May 1982, at 20: "[T]he
bankruptcy proceeding allowed . . . [restauranteur Stanford Glazer] to keep the
equity in the house he bought for $320,000. . . [plus] his Jaguar XJ-S, his Cadillac
and his Jeep." He also retained his $100,000-plus yearly salary through a series of
transactions through which he repurchased his business at a premium, borrowing
from the same creditor to whom he was previously indebted. Id.
2. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087-88.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. V 1981). The United States Supreme
Court emphasized the fresh start policy inherent in the former Bankruptcy Act in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934):
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portance and potential effect of understanding and utilizing the bankruptcy
exemption laws.4 This Article examines those laws which permit a bank-
rupt to retain property free of creditor's claims, concentrating particularly
on the relationship between the federal and Missouri exemption provisions.
Prior to enactment of the 1978 Code, the task of formulating a substan-
tive exemption policy was abdicated to the states.5 As a result, an incongru-
ous patchwork of exemptions was created, varying greatly from state to
state.6 In an effort to provide debtors with an alternative to state exemp-
tions, many of which were outdated, the 1978 Code permits the debtor to
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him
to start afresh free of the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes." . . This purpose of the act has been again and
again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private inter-
est, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders
for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankrupty, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Id. at 244 (citations omitted). The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
similarly acknowledges that "there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that
goes through bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh
start." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087.
4. Stanford Glazer was able to retain his business salary and two of his cars
due to a unique business deal wherein he was able to buy back his business from the
creditor on a deferred payment at a premium price. He was able to retain his house
and one car by utilizing the Kansas exemption statutes. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2301 (1980) exempts all equity in a debtor's home (in fact, a debtor can pay down
the mortgage to shield any cash on hand from creditors) and id. § 60-2304(3) ex-
empts "[o]ne means of conveyance regularly used for the transportation of the per-
son or for transportation to and from the person's regular place of work, without
regard to the value of such vehicle."
5. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978), pro-
vided that:
[Tjhis title shall not affect the allowance of bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they
have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in any
other State.
6. See Duncan, Through the Trap Door Darky: Nebraska Exemption Policy and the
Bankrupty Reform Act of 1978, 20 NEB. L. REV. 219 (1981):
Exemptions in some states were criticized as being obsolete and "parsimo-
nious in the extreme.". . . [O]ther states' exemptions were perceived as
being overly generous to debtors and unfair to creditors. The result was a
bankruptcy exemption policy which treated debtors and creditors un-
equally based solely upon the domicile of the debtor.
Id. at 222 (citing Countryman, Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2
[Vol. 48
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elect either the enumerated federal exemptions7 or the applicable nonbank-
ruptcy exemptions. Any state, however, can deny the right to elect federal
exemptions by passing legislation specifically opting out of the federal
scheme.8 A majority of states have elected to enact their own exemption
laws, reflecting their views of creditors' rights and the state's particular geo-
graphic and economic needs.9 On August 13, 1982, Missouri joined those
states that have opted out of the federal exemption scheme, 0 thereby limit-
ing debtors filing bankruptcy in Missouri to those exemptions provided in
Missouri law.
II. THE EXEMPTION STATUTES: FEDERAL AND MISSOURI
In order to comprehend the impact of the opt-out provision, it is neces-
sary to consider the federal exemptions as provided in section 522(d) of the
1978 Code. This section provides exemptions for numerous categories of
(1978)). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. V 1981).
8. See id. § 522(b). This section resulted from a compromise between the
House and Senate bills. The original House bill permitted a debtor to elect either a
federal list of exemptions or those exemptions available under non-bankruptcy law.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522(b) (1977). The Senate version followed the
approach of the former act and deferred to non-bankruptcy exemptions. S. 2266,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522(b) (1977). As enacted, section 522(b) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may ex-
empt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph
(2) (A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alter-
native,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law . ...
9. For example, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260 (West 1980), allows a head of family
a homestead exemption of $45,000, presumably due to the high cost of real estate in
that area. In Kansas, the homestead exemption may consist of 160 acres of farm
land or one acre within the limits of an incorporated town or city. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2301 (Supp. 1982).
10. This is the effective date of Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.427 (Supp. 1982), which
provides:
Every person by or against whom an order is sought for relief under
Title 11, United States Code, shall be permitted to exempt from property
of the estate any property that is exempt from attachment and execution
under the law of the state of Missouri or under federal law, other than
Title 11, United States Code, Section 522(d), and no such person is au-
thorized to claim as exempt the property that is specified under Title 11,
United States Code, Section 522(d).
1983]
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specific property, including a homestead exemption 1' of $7,500 in real or
personal property used by the debtor as a residence; an exemption for one
motor vehicle in the amount of $1,200; plus exemptions for personal effects
up to $200 per item, $500 in jewelry, $750 in implements, professional
books, and tools of the trade, unlimited life insurance contract rights, and
$4,000 in life insurance dividends, interest, and loan value. The federal
provisions also allow reasonable exemption of alimony and pensions and
unlimited exemption of health aids and government benefits. 2 In addition
to the provisions which exempt distinct property, section 522(d)(5) of the
1978 Code exempts "[t]he debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value
$400pius any unused amount of the [homestead] exemption. . . , in anyfprop ery. ""
This subsection, commonly referred to as the "wild card" provision, enables
a debtor, at his discretion, to select any type of property to exempt with a
potential combined exemption of up to $7,900.4 As demonstrated by legis-
lative history, Congress intended that this innovative provision would avoid
the prior discrimination against non-homeowners.' 5 Renters are an ex-
panding and significant portion of the populace, replacing the homeowners
of the past who could endure losses accompanying times of financial hard-
ship as long as they retained ownership of their house and enough land to
provide for their basic needs. By utilizing the wild card provision, the non-
homeowner, or the 4homeowner with minimal equity in his property, can
avail himself of the homestead exemption by exempting valuable property
to the extent of the unused portion of that exemption.
Exclusion of a comparable wild card provision from state exemption
statutes, in states which have elected to opt out of the federal exemptions,
has created a furor of constitutional attacks on the allegedly deficient state
provisions. Debtors have charged that the failure of states to include a wild
card exemption violates the constitutional provision that Congress may "es-
tablish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."' 6 Violations of the
11. The homestead exemption traditionally permits a debtor to exempt a pre-
scribed amount of equity in his residence.
12. In brief, the remaining exemptions enumerated in section 522(d) are the
debtor's right to receive, or property which is traceable to, an award under a crime
victim's reparation law; a reasonable wrongful death award or life insurance pay-
ment for an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent; payment, not to ex-
ceed $7,500 for personal injuries; and reasonable payment in compensation for loss
of future earnings of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. V 1981).
13. Id. § 522(d)(5) (emphasis added).
14. This sum equals the unused portion of the $7,500 homestead exemption
plus $400.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6316-17. ("Paragraph (5) [of § 522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code] permits the exemption of $500.00, plus any unused amount of
the homestead exemption, in any property, in order not to discriminate against the
nonhomeowner.").
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
[Vol. 48
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supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 17 also have been al-
leged, as debtors claim that the federal wild card provision has preempted
inconsistent state statutes. Further, the provision which permits states to
opt out of the federal exemptions has been attacked as an impermissible
delegation of congressional power.
In addition to the controversy with regard to whether states should be
required to provide their bankrupts with a wild card provision, there has
been extensive litigation as to whether the opt-out provision permits states
to avoid other sections of the 1978 Code besides the laundry list of exemp-
tions in section 522(d). More specifically, there has been substantial litiga-
tion concerning section 522(f),18 which permits a debtor to avoid a judicial
lien or a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household
goods, and section 522(m),' 9 which requires exemptions to apply separately
with respect to each debtor in a joint case.
With Missouri's decision to opt out of the federal exemptions comes the
susceptibility of the state exemption statutes to constitutional challenge.
20
The Missouri statutes generally provide for the following exemptions: a
homestead exemption of $8,000, consisting of a dwelling house and the land
used in connection therewith;2 1 a separate exemption in the amount of
$1,000 for a mobile home used as a principal residence; an exemption of
$500 for one motor vehicle; plus exemptions for personal effects ($1,000),
jewelry ($500), tools of the trade ($2,000), unlimited life insurance contract
rights, and life insurance loan value ($5,000).2' The Missouri statute also
exempts $500 per month in alimony and, as with the federal scheme, per-
mits reasonable exemptions for pensions and unlimited exemptions for
health aids and government benefits.2 3 Additional provisions exempt
"[a]ny other property of any kind, not to exceed in value. . . [$400] in the
aggregate,' '2 4 and provide that "[e]ach head of a family may . . . exempt
. . . any other property . . . not exceeding in value . . . [$850] plus . . .
[$250] for each of such person's unmarried dependent children under the
17. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. For a discussion of the supremacy/delegation argument,
see Part III infra.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 522( (Supp. V 1981). See In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1982); In re Snellings, 10 Bankr. 949 (W.D. Va. 1981); Part III.B infra.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. V 1981). See Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d
60 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Wilson, 22 Bankr. 146 (D. Or. 1982); In re Hartmann, 19
Bankr. 844 (D. Neb. 1982); In re Morgan, 15 Bankr. 620 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re
Thompson, 4 Bankr. 823 (E.D. Va. 1980).
20. To date, at least 17 of the 29 states that have opted out of the federal
exemptions have had their statutes contested on constitutional grounds.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.475 (Supp. 1982).
22. Id. § 513.430(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8).
23. Id. § 513.430(9), (10). Id. § 513.430(1 1) exempts the debtor's right to re-
ceive payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the
debtor was a dependent.
24. Id. § 513.430(3).
1983]
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age of eighteen years, except ten percent of any debt, income, salary or
wages due such head of a family."
25
A comparison of the Missouri exemptions with the federal provisions
reveals that Missouri provides a total exemption of $1,000 for personal ef-
fects, while federal law has no ceiling on the total exemption for personal
goods provided each item is $200 or less. 26 Although there is not a large
variance in many of the state and federal provisions exempting specific
27property, Missouri provides an exemption for tools of the trade of $1,250
more than federal law.21 While federal exemptions provide for reasonable
exemption of alimony and pensions, Missouri limits the former to $500 per
month.
29
One of the most significant differences between the Missouri and fed-
eral exemptions is the wild card exemption. Although Missouri allows the
debtor some latitude to determine the assets he desires to to exempt,"0 it
provides no correlative provision to the federal wild card exemption. By
specifically providing an exemption for a mobile home residence (permit-
ting a much smaller exemption than for a dwelling used as a homestead)
and altogether ignoring renters, the Missouri legislature has manifested a
policy designed to exempt equity in a dwelling house or mobile home and
to provide no exemption where there is no such equity. In other words, it
appears that the legislature viewed equality as providing the debtor with a
place to live, whether it be a single family home, a mobile home, or an
apartment (the latter being safe from attachment by creditors, since the
debtor has no equity or ownership rights). As demonstrated by the indiffer-
ence to renters, equality is not viewed in terms of providing an equal dollar
amount of exemption to each debtor, as under federal law. Although the
Missouri approach differs from the federal exemption scheme, the Missouri
25. Id. § 513.440.
26. Compare 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(3) (Supp. V 1981) with Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 513.430 (Supp. 1982).
27. For example, both statutes provide exemptions for personal jewelry in the
amount of $500 (Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.430(2) (Supp. 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(4)
(Supp. V 1981)); unlimited life insurance contract rights (Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 513.430(7) (Supp. 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) (Supp. V 1981)); unlimited health
aids and government benefits (Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.430(9), (10) (Supp. 1982); 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(9), (10) (Supp. V 1981)).
28. Pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.430(4) (Supp. 1982), the debtor may
exempt "[a]ny implements, professional books or tools of the trade of such person
. . . not to exceed two thousand dollars in value in the aggregate." In contrast, 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (Supp. V 1981) permits exemption of the "debtor's aggregate
interest, not to exceed $750 in value," in tools of the trade. Of course, a debtor
electing federal exemptions may increase the tools of the trade exemption through
use of the wild card provision.
29. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.430(10) (Supp. 1982) with 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10)(D) (Supp. V 1981).
30. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 513.430(3), .440 (Supp. 1982).
[Vol. 48
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statutes appear to promote effectively the two foremost goals of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code: (1) permitting each debtor, depending on his specific
living situation, to retain enough property to ensure a fresh start and
(2) providing the maximum amount of property for the benefit of the
creditors.3 '
In considering these goals, it is arguable that the Missouri statutes
more effectively adhere to the purposes of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code than
do the federal provisions, as the former emphasize that the debtor retain in
kind the essentials that permit him a fresh start, while the federal law per-
mits a renter to exempt any property, thereby depriving creditors, whether
or not the property is required to enable the debtor to get back on his feet.3 2
Regardless of the effectiveness of the Missouri homestead exemption, simi-
lar state statutes have been successfully attacked on constitutional grounds
as contravening the standard set by the wild card provision.
Missouri's exemption statutes also deviate substantially from the fed-
eral exemptions with regard to who may use the exemptions. Section
522(m) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code applies "separately with respect to
each debtor in a joint case." 3 But Missouri's homestead statute provides:
The exemption allowed under this section shall not be allowed for
more than one owner of any homestead if one owner claims the
entire amount allowed under this subsection; but, if more than
one owner of any homestead claims an exemption under this sec-
tion, the exemption allowed to each of such owners shall not ex-
ceed, in the aggregate, the total exemption allowed under this
subsection as to any one homestead. 4
Accordingly, Missouri allows only one homestead exemption, either for
married debtors filing jointly or for divorced debtors who retain co-owner-
ship of one homestead, while the federal statute permits each spouse to re-
ceive a separate exemption.
At the present time it does not appear as though the new Missouri
exemptions will affect the lien avoidance provisions of section 522() of the
1978 Code.3 ' However, other states that have opted out of the federal ex-
31. See note 3 supra; see also In re Bradford, 6 Bankr. 741, 744 (D. Nev. 1980)
("The objective of bankruptcy laws is to equitably distribute the bankrupt's assets
among creditors and to enable the bankrupt to make a fresh start.").
32. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1973); Countryman,
supra note 6. "To the extent that. . . exemption laws are excessively generous and
protect more of the debtor's property than is necessary for his fresh start, they im-
pede the federal bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution to creditors." Duncan,
supra note 6, at 222.
33. 11 U.S.C. §522(m) (Supp. V 1981).
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.475(1) (Supp. 1982).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (Supp. V 1981). There is no mention of lien avoidance
in the new Missouri statutes. However, the property in which a debtor may avoid a
1983)
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emptions also have attempted to eschew section 522(o, either legislatively
3 6
or judicially.3 7 Although the Missouri legislature has declined to opt out of
the federal lien avoidance statute, the Missouri courts may have an oppor-
tunity to determine whether Missouri's opt-out affects lien avoidance as
well as exemptions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ATrACKS ON STATE OPT-OUT STATUTES
Section 522(b) (1) of the 1978 Code3 8 occupies a somewhat unique posi-
tion in our system of dual federalism. It does not itself contain any express
limitations on the grant of power to the states to deny citizens of a state the
use of the federal exemptions. This grant of power could conceivably in-
clude an ability to limit a debtor's exemptions to a list of inconsequential
items. Such a result could greatly impair the fresh start concept which
forms an important basis of federal bankruptcy law. This seeming incon-
gruity in the possible effect of section 522(b)(1) has led to some conflicting
decisions by those courts called on to interpret state opt-out statutes in light
of the remainder of the 1978 Code.
Constitutional attacks on the various state opt-out statutes have al-
ready taken several forms. Undoubtedly, with the passage of time, argu-
ments will be attempted that differ from those discussed in this Article. At
this point, three separate arguments have, been raised.
The first argument has the longest history and an unbroken string of
failures. The argument involves the power granted to the federal govern-
ment in the Constitution to "establish uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 9 The concept underlying
this argument is that to allow each state to enact its own individual exemp-
tion scheme inherently violates the uniformity requirement set forth in the
Constitution. But early Supreme Court decisions interpret the uniformity
requirement as involving only "geographical uniformity."4 Under this in-
terpretation, uniformity within a given state will satisfy the constitutional
requirement. At this time there is no indication that any segment of the
judiciary would reconsider the past decisions in this area,41 and the uni-
formity requirement can probably be considered of little practical use in
challenging the validity of state exemption statutes.
lien will be indirectly affected by the increased exemption for tools of the trade and
decreased exemptions in other areas.
36. See, e.g., In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982); Part III.B infra.
37. See, e.g., In re Foster, 16 Bankr. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
40. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); Fairbank v.
United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); The
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
41. For an example of a recent decision applying the reasoning of the early
Supreme Court cases, see In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1133 (7th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 48
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The second of the constitutional arguments was raised by the
debtor/plaintiff in In re Kelley.42 The debtor, a single woman, argued that
the Florida statute prohibiting her from using the federal exemptions was
unconstitutional because some of the state exemptions were available only
to a debtor who was head of a family. Although the Florida statute pro-
vided a family head with exemptions somewhat similar to those provided
under federal law, comparable exemptions were not provided to the non-
head of a family.4" Faced with the equal protection issue, the Kelley court
stated, "[T]he decisive issue before this Court is whether or not the Florida
exemptions accord plaintiff treatment so arbitrary and disparate that she is
denied equal protection of the law."'  The court found the test for chal-
lenges based on the equal protection clause to be that set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed:4 5 when essentially economic
legislation is involved, the different treatment accorded different classes by
a statute need only be reasonably related to some legitimate objective of the
statute.4 6 If a classification is reasonable and not arbitrary, equal protec-
tion demands only that the statute treat all persons within a class equally.
Very little legislation has been invalidated under this particular test.4 7 The
court in Kelley continued this trend by finding the Florida statute constitu-
tional. The law's purpose was stated to be "to promote the stability and
welfare of the state by encouraging property ownership and independence
on the part of the citizen, and by preserving a home where the family may
be sheltered and live beyond the reach of economic misfortune."4 8 The
court found that this purpose had a fair and substantial relation to the
designation of classes based on status as the head of a family.49 In light of
such a finding, the statute survived equal protection attack.
Unlike the uniformity argument, the equal protection argument does
not seem to be a settled issue despite the court's ruling in Kelley. Many of
the state exemption schemes discriminate in whole or in part between heads
of family and other classifications.5" Despite the traditional deference the
42. 21 Bankr. 375 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1983).
44. 21 Bankr. at 376. In deciding this issue, the Kelley court considered an
earlier decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Flor-
ida which had declared the Florida exemption scheme constitutional in the face of a
challenge based on the uniformity requirement. In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162, 163
(M.D. Fla. 1981). Lausch provides another recent example of a court accepting the
continued validity of the geographical uniformity concept.
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. Id. at 75-76.
47. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding requirement that
fees be paid as a condition of discharge in voluntary bankruptcy).
48. 21 Bankr. at 376.
49. Id.
50. Missouri's exemption scheme is among those which provide greater exemp-
tions for a head of family. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.440 (Supp. 1982).
1983]
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judiciary has shown to legislatures when faced with equal protection attacks
on economic legislation, it is possible that a court may become convinced
that a constitutional violation exists if faced with an egregious discrimina-
tion with little or no real justification. Classifications based on status as the
head of a family are inherently troublesome, raising such issues as what
effect a divorce or separation has on status, the ability of a spouse to claim
exemptions, and the status of a family head who is not primarily responsible
for the support of that family. Because such classifications exist in many of
the state exemption schemes, the equal protection argument is very likely to
resurface.51
The third argument that has been raised regarding the constitutional-
ity of state opt-out provisions is based on the supremacy clause of the Con-
stitution.5 2 Implicit in the argument is the concept of the proper delegation
of powers by Congress to the states. This argument is the most important of
those discussed herein and, unlike the previous two arguments, has met
with some success in the courts. The basic issue involves the validity of
homestead exemptions in light of their effect on the position of non-home-
owners vis-a-vis homeowners. The present federal exemptions take a differ-
ent approach to the homestead exemption than did the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act5 3 (and than do many of the state exemption statutes). 4 The legislative
history of the wild card exemption provided in section 522(d)(5) makes it
clear that Congress intended, by enacting that subsection, to equalize the
exemptions available to a homeowner with equity in his property and to
other classes of debtors. 55 However, inequality in the treatment of the two
groups can be effectively reinstated by a state which opts out of the section
522(d) exemptions but does not provide equal exemptions for homeowners
and non-homeowners in its own exemption statute.
Although it can be argued that there is at least some justification for
51. In In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1132 n.1 (7th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff
raised an equal protection challenge to the Illinois statute, but the challenge was
deemed waived when not developed in the plaintiff's opening or reply brief. A
similar challenge was rejected, however, in In re Goering, 23 Bankr. 1010 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States. . . made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land
. . . any Thing in the. . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978).
54. Many state exemption statutes, the only exemptions available under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, have been on the books for years and are regarded as
antiquated and outmoded. Congressional dissatisfaction with the existing state ex-
emption laws can be found throughout the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 5963, 6087.
55. See id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6089; see also
In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) (excellent discussion of legislative
history and congressional intent behind section 522(d)(5)).
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allowing a homeowner faced with the loss of his home a greater exemption
than a non-homeowner, that is not the focus of the supremacy/delegation
argument. The issue is not whether the treatment of homeowners and non-
homeowners should be equalized but whether Congress intended to equalize
the treatment, whether by enacting section 522(d)(5) Congress meant to
express a policy so inherent in federal bankruptcy law that the policy forms
a limitation on the power granted the states in section 522(b)(1). This argu-
ment has been found wanting in some courts but has, at least temporarily,
prevailed in others. It is an argument to which the new Missouri exemption
statute will undoubtedly be exposed.
The primary case in which the supremacy/delegation argument was
accepted is In re Rhodes,5" in which the lower court found that the Tennessee
General Assembly had exceeded the authority granted it under section
522(b) (1) in enacting the Tennessee opt-out statute.5 7 The court based its
decision both on unlawful delegation of power by Congress and on a per-
ceived violation of the supremacy clause, finding precedent for the decision
in two earlier cases: Cheeseman v. Nachman"8 and In re Smith." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, however, on both
grounds, rejecting the strict interpretation of the lower court.6"
A recent case in which the supremacy/delegation argument was ac-
cepted by a court is In re Locarno."6 There the court thoroughly reviewed
the existing case law on the subject before finding that, under a two-step
test,62 the Maryland statute went beyond the permissible scope of power
delegated to the states under section 522(b)(1) and therefore violated the
supremacy clause.63 More specifically, the court stated:
56. 14 Bankr. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2-101 to -311 (1980).
58. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981). Cheeseman dealt primarily with a conflict be-
tween a state opt-out provision and 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. V 1981). For a
detailed treatment of this case, see Part III.A infira.
59. 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981). Smith involved interpretation of the federal
exemption statutes. The constitutionality of a state opt-out provision was not
contested.
60. Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983). The court of appeals
sustained the congressional opt-out scheme as within the legislative duty to establish
uniform bankruptcy laws. Id. at 162. The court also interpreted section 522(b)(1)
as an express congressional refusal to pre-empt the field of bankruptcy exemptions.
Id. at 163.
61. 23 Bankr. 622 (D. Md. 1982).
62. The court applied the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971): "first ascertaining the construction of the two
statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in con-
flict." 23 Bankr. at 629.
63. 23 Bankr. at 630. The court noted an earlier Maryland bankruptcy court
case, In re Davis, 16 Bankr. 62 (D. Md. 1981), in which the Maryland opt-out stat-
ute was found to be violative of the supremacy clause. Id. at 64.
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[I]n preferring one class of debtor over another class, by denying
to nonhomeowner-debtors the same treatment afforded to home-
owner-debtors, the Maryland exemption statute conflicts with the
avowed policy of the Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy code of
granting to all debtors a "fresh start." Because of the failure of the
Maryland General Assembly to provide a comparable exemption
to nonhomeowners as it provided to homeowners in § 11-504()(1),
it has exceeded the congressional delegation of power to "opt-out"
of the federal exemptions, thus rendering § 11-504(2) unconstitu-
tional and void.64
The court specifically discussed the contrary decision reached by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re Sullivan65 but re-
jected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning.66
After finding the attempt by the Maryland legislature to opt out of the
federal exemptions unconstitutional and void, the court went on to hold
that the opt-out provision could be severed from the rest of the exemption
legislation, leaving the remainder intact as an alternative list of exemptions
to those provided in section 522(d). In so finding, the court stated:
Subsection 11-504(g) is found to be severable from the remainder
of the Maryland exemption statute on two grounds. First, if there
is no "opt-out" provision which prevents a debtor from claiming
the federal exemptions, the state is free to enact such exemptions
as it has, without fear of exceeding the scope of the power dele-
gated by Congress. It is this abuse of the delegated power which
rendered invalid the action of the state. To hold unconstitutional
the state exemptions themselves, absent an "opt-out" of the fed-
eral exemptions would defeat the congressional purpose of giving
debtors a choice between the state and federal exemptions."
Locamo serves to illustrate the continuing nature of the controversy regard-
ing state opt-out statutes when challenged in light of the
supremacy/delegation argument.
Other cases in which courts have accepted or indicated some sympathy
toward the supremacy/delegation argument include Zn re Parrsh 6 and In re
64. 23 Bankr. at 630.
65. 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982). Sullivan is discussed in greater detail in text
accompanying notes 72-76 injfa. The decision in that case is in direct conflict with
Locarno and other similar cases.
66. 23 Bankr. at 631.
67. Id.
68. 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982). Although the court held in Parrish that
what constitutes property adequate to provide a fresh start may vary from the stan-
dards set in § 522(d) and that the Colorado exemption statute was constitutional,
the court stated:
The Court agrees with those cases cited by the debtor that state that
Congress cannot delegate unfettered authority to the states to regulate
bankruptcy exemptions. The states, if they decide to exercise the "opt-
out" authority delegated by Congress must provide their citizens with a
[Vol. 48
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Balgemann ,69 These cases combine the delegation concept with an interpre-
tation of the effect of the supremacy clause and, in fact, the two concepts
are very closely related in this area. Basically, courts have acknowledged
that the Constitution grants Congress the power to enact federal laws in the
area of bankruptcy. When Congress acts to set federal standards in an area
where the Constitution grants it control, it cannot constitutionally delegate
power to the states such that the states, acting under that delegated power,
would be able to enact laws which effectively conflict with the federal stan-
dards previously set by Congress. To do so is both an unlawful delegation
of power and a violation of the supremacy clause. This conflict is the incon-
gruity seemingly inherent in section 522(b)(1). Congress both sets federal
standards (and seemingly federal policy) and then apparently gives the
states the power to act in a manner which could effectively destroy those
standards.
Other courts have not been convinced by the supremacy/delegation
argument. In In re Lausch,70 the court rejected a delegation argument and
stated:
By providing a list of federal exemptions, Congress made a limited
exercise of its bankruptcy power, leaving the states to exercise
their concurrent power to determine the available bankruptcy ex-
emptions. Therefore, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) is not an unconstitu-
tional delegation of congressional legislative power but is merely a
recognition of the concurrent legislative power of the state legisla-
tures to enact laws governing bankruptcy exemptions.
7 1
Although addressed primarily to the delegation concept, the court necessar-
ily considered and rejected the idea of a supremacy clause violation in its
finding that concurrent jurisdiction existed. There can be no supremacy
clause violation unless Congress has in some way acted to preempt the field
under consideration.
A case in which the court directly considered and rejected the reason-
ing in Rhodes is In re Sullivan.72 In Sullivan, the court examined the "marked
scheme of bankruptcy exemptions that is not inconsistent with those of the
Code.
Id. at 335. The Colorado exemption scheme, while not identical to that provided in
§ 522(d), was found to be "quite close" and therefore withstood constitutional chal-
lenge. Id.
69. 16 Bankr. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Balgemann held the Illinois opt-out statute
and exemption list invalid as violative of the supremacy clause. The continued
validity of Balgemann must be considered doubtful in light of the Seventh Circuit's
decision upholding the same statutes in In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.
1982).
70. 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
71. Id. at 165.
72. 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982). Sullivan discusses the uniformity argument
as well as the preemption/delegation/supremacy argument. The case provides an
excellent chart of the case law development interpreting § 522(b)(1)).
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discrepancy" between the federal exemptions and the Illinois exemption
scheme in the face of uniformity and supremacy/delegation arguments.
The court found the Illinois statutes valid.73 Once again, the primary issue
was different treatment of homeowners and non-homeowners. After hold-
ing that only geographical uniformity was constitutionally required,7 4 the
court turned its attention to the Rhodes decision, stating:
[W]e are not persuaded by the reasoning of the Rhodes court.
First, . . . it is not accurate to attribute the motivation of the
House in proposing the Section 522(d) exemptions to the Congress
that eventually enacted the Code. The statute's treatment of ex-
emptions reflects at the very least a mixed intention on the part of
Congress. Second, and more significant, the Rhodes court is apply-
ing a preemption analysis to a situation in which Congress has
speciftaly directed that a state can choose to declare Section 522(d)
inapplicable to its citizens. To apply a preemption analysis in this
context is to ignore totally the explicit language of the Section
522(b) (1) opt-out provision. 75
The court went on to state: "Where a state is thus exercising its own power,
no unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power can be found. 7 6
It is evident that different courts have arrived at sharply contrasting
interpretations of the meaning and effect of section 522(b)(1). Which inter-
pretation will ultimately prevail is not evident at this time.77 The recent
Missouri opt-out statute does, however, appear to be potentially vulnerable
to a Rhodes-type attack. Missouri Revised Statutes section 513.47571 pro-
vides a homestead exemption of up to $8,000 in a person's "dwelling house
and appurtenances, and the land used in connection therewith." Although
an exemption is also provided for mobile homes,79 it is not equal to that
provided in the homestead exemption and there is no other provision equal-
izing the treatment between homeowners and nonhomeowners. This differ-
ing treatment of the two groups is the basis for the Rhodes opinion. Whether
or not the Missouri statute will be invalidated, as were those of Tennessee
and Maryland, will depend on the interpretation of the courts when and if
they are faced with the issues involved. The Missouri legislators should
have been aware of the constitutional questions concerning opt-out statutes.
They apparently chose to enact the present statute despite these questions.
73. 680 F.2d at 1138.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1136.
76. Id. at 1137.
77. In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision invalidating the ju-
risdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), the question may very well
become moot before it is finally settled.
78. (Supp. 1982).
79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.430(6) (Supp. 1982).
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Whether or not the courts will consider their actions to be constitutionally
valid remains to be seen.
A. Section 522(m)
The Missouri legislature has gone to great lengths to insure that each
homestead is entitled to the maximum exemption of $8,000, regardless of
whether one or two debtors own that particular dwelling. According to
Missouri Revised Statutes section 513.475,80 the homestead exemption per-
mits only one owner of a residence to claim the entire amount. If more than
one owner claims the exemption, the exemption allowed shall not exceed in
the aggregate the total exemption allowed. In effect, only one debtor in a
joint case is allowed the full benefit of the homestead exemption. Thus,
Missouri's homestead exemption contravenes section 522(m) of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, which provides that "[t]his section shall apply separately
with respect to each debtor in a joint case."'
Virginia was the first state to judicially reconcile its homestead exemp-
tion with section 522(m). Virginia Code section 34-4 provides that "[e]very
householder or head of family. . . shall be entitled . . . to hold exempt
. ..his real and personal property. . . to the value of not exceeding five
thousand dollars."8 2 Under Virginia Code section 34-1, the term "house-
holder" includes "any person, married or unmarried, who maintains a sepa-
rate residence or living quarters, whether or not others are living with
him." 3 Head of a family is not defined.8 4 Although the decisions of the
Virginia bankruptcy courts differ as to whether the Virginia homestead ex-
emption is available to both a husband and wife living together,8 5 the first
district court to consider the question ruled that either the husband or wife
80. (Supp. 1982).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. V 1981).
82. VA. CODE § 34-4 (1979). Virginia opted out of the federal exemption stat-
utes by enacting id. § 34-3.1 which provides: "No individual may exempt from the
property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the property specified in sub-
section (d) of § 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as
may otherwise be expressly permitted under this title."
83. Id. § 34-1.
84. However, "the terms householder and head of household [are] interchange-
able." In re Thompson, 4 Bankr. 823, 825 (E.D. Va. 1980).
85. The court in In re Thompson, 2 Bankr. 380 (E.D. Va. 1979), allowed a
debtor wife to file a homestead deed under Virginia law and thus claim an exemp-
tion in the bankruptcy proceeding for the property listed on the deed. See also In re
White, 11 Bankr. 775 (E.D. Va. 1981), wherein the court held that the wife was not
entitled to the homestead exemption when she and her husband filed jointly. Id. at
776. The court also held that even though the Virginia statute, as interpreted by
the court, did not permit each debtor to claim exemptions as prescribed under the
federal bankruptcy law, it was constitutional due to the specific federal opt-out pro-
vision. Id. The court inIn re Morgan, 15 Bankr. 620 (E.D. Va. 1981), was not faced
with deciding whether both debtors may exempt property, since the trustee with-
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is entitled to the exemption in this situation, never both.8 6 In support of its
decision, the court found that the state legislature
intended that single persons maintaining a separate residence and
persons separated or divorced from their spouses and maintaining
a separate residence should be entitled to an exemption ....
The Legislature did not . . . intend to grant double exemptions
where there was one residence occupied by two people, that is, in
this case, a man and his wife. 7
After reaching this decision, the court cursorily dismissed the constitutional
conflict inherent in its interpretation of the Virginia homestead
exemption.
8 8
When faced with the same issue, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Virginia statute must be read as al-
lowing a homestead exemption to each spouse, living together, if he or she
contributes to the maintenance of the household, citing the ambiguities in
the "householder" definition and the strong policy considerations of con-
serving the family home.89 In interpreting the definitional statute, the
court stated:
It may be read to allow one person in each residence to be a
householder because the other people living with him or her typi-
cally do not maintain other "separate" residences. Under the con-
struction, a husband and wife living together could not both be
householders because they would not be living in residences sepa-
rate from each other. On the other hand, this statute may as eas-
ily be construed to permit any individual who contributes to the
maintenance of a residence, without regard to whether others in
the same residence contribute to its maintenance, to be a house-
holder. For example, a young married couple living together, but
apart from either set of their parents, could be regarded as main-
taining a "separate" residence. Under this latter construction, a
husband and wife could both be householders.
90
drew his objection following the decision in Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60
(4th Cir. 1981).
86. In re Thompson, 4 Bankr. 823, 825 (E.D. Va. 1980).
87. Id.
88. The court rejected the constitutional attack, stating:
[T]his interpretation does not challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute, which this Court is loathe to do, as statutes should be con-
strued, if fairly possible, to avoid constitutional questions. . . . Further-
more, it is an axiom of statutory construction that a statute is accorded a
presumption of validity and that a reviewing court should endeavor to
adopt a construction upholding validity.
Id.
89. Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1981). The lower court
had denied the wife's status as a householder and precluded her from claiming a
Virginia homestead exemption. Id. at 61.
90. Id. at 63.
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In comparison with the Virginia exemption, it appears that the Mis-
souri homestead exemption cannot be interpreted to allow a husband and
wife living together each to utilize a homestead exemption of $8,000. The
statute clearly dictates that "if more than one owner of a homestead claims
an exemption under this section, the exemption allowed to each of such
owners shall not exceed, in the aggregate, the total exemption allowed
under this subsection as to any homestead."'" By this specific wording, the
ambiguity created by the definitions found in the Virginia statute has been
avoided.
The Missouri homestead exemption also serves public policy considera-
tions of conserving the family home.92 Since "the [joint] debtors (husband
and wife) have one residence; since they are not living separately, there is
only one home to conserve."9 3 Separation or divorce will not entitle the
debtors to an additional homestead exemption unless one of the debtors
purchases an additional residence. This aspect of the homestead exemption
may encourage far-sighted debtors to perpetrate the appearance of separate
residences in order to retain more than one dwelling, especially in a case
where the debtors own a vacation home in addition to their principal resi-
dence. Further, the outcome with regard to who gets the exemption is un-
certain under the Missouri statute when joint debtors do not file their
petitions simultaneously.94 It is unclear whether the first debtor to file is
entitled to the entire homestead exemption or whether an equitable division
of the exemption is required.
If indeed the Missouri homestead exemption may in effect be used by
only one debtor in a joint case, then the constitutionality of the statute in
light of section 522(m) of the 1978 Code must be considered. In a recent
Nebraska case, In re Hartmann,95 the court ruled that only the husband was
entitled to the Nebraska homestead exemption because only "heads of fami-
lies" are entitled to the exemption." In reconciling this ruling with section
522(m), the court stated:
Although it is true that sub-section (m) could not be altered
by the Nebraska legislature, when the legislature decided that the
federal exemptions of sub-section (d) would not be applicable to
petitions filed in the state, the alternative provision under
§ 522(b)(1) was no longer operative and reference under sub-sec-
tion (b) reverted to sub-paragraph (2). The result is that an indi-
91. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.475 (Supp. 1982).
92. Compare the court's discussion of public policy considerations in Cheeseman,
656 F.2d at 64.
93. In re Thompson, 4 Bankr. 823, 825 (E.D. Va. 1980).
94. This situation would occur most frequently when one party to a recent
divorce files bankruptcy.
95. 19 Bankr. 844 (D. Neb. 1982).
96. Id. at 845. Compare Cheeseman, where the court defined "householder" to
include each spouse living together, if he or she contributes to the maintenance of
the household. 656 F.2d at 63.
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vidual in Nebraska must look solely to state law for his
exemptions. In other words, if property is exempt to others under
state law but not to the specific individual, that individual may
not by analogy claim the exemptions for himself.9 7
This explanation usurps the explicit language of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code. Section 522(b)(1) provides that a debtor may exempt property under
subsection (d) unless state law prohibits. Accordingly, the opt-out provision
only precludes a debtor from exempting the property listed in section
522(d).9" All other provisions remain unaffected.99 Therefore, section
522(m), a directive by Congress to assure each debtor the benefit of all ex-
emptions, must be adhered to. Neither a bankruptcy court nor a state legis-
lature may single out one debtor in a joint case to receive the benefit of the
homestead exemption.
The bankruptcy court in Oregon has analyzed the federal statute with
regard to its state exemption for personal property."m Notwithstanding its
recognition that the statute applied to each debtor in a joint case, based on
legislative intent and liberal statutory construction, the court was unim-
pressed with section 522(m). The court was "not persuaded that § 522(m)
is a limiting power on the exemption scheme of a state which has chosen to
'opt out' of the federal exemption scheme."'O' Rather, the court viewed
section 522(b) as a carte blanche for states to define their own exemptions
without limitation.10 2
However, the majority of the cases that have considered the scope of
the opt-out provision have confined avoidance of the federal exemptions
97. 19 Bankr. at 845.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981), which provides that a debtor
may exempt "property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless
State law. . . specifically does not so authorize."
99. See In re Stacey, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 932 (S.D. Cal. 1982), where the
court stated that the opt-out statute permitted the states to adopt, if they so chose,
legislation which does not authorize debtors domiciled within their borders to avail
themselves of the provisions of § 522(d)(1)-(1 1). Id. at 933. Also, numerous cases
have limited the opt out to § 522(d) when considering the effect the provision has
on § 522(0. See In re Strain, 16 Bankr. 797 (D. Idaho 1982); In re Fredrickson, 12
Bankr. 506 (D.S.D. 1981); In re Meadows, 9 Bankr. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
In re Pearl, 28 Bankr. 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) recognized a direct conflict between
the New York homestead exemption and section 522(m). The New York law al-
lowed only one exemption per homestead res, regardless of the number of debtors
owning the property. The court held that the state scheme must yield to the federal
policy and allowed joint debtors to double their homestead exemption. Id. at 495-
96.
100. In re Wilson, 22 Bankr. 146 (D. Or. 1982). In this case, the debtors, mem-
bers of the same household, sought to claim exemptions exceeding $400 in the ag-
gregate but less than $800 for personal property.
101. Id. at 148.
102. Id. ("Legislative history ...shows an intention to provide the states an
unlimited right to define their own exemptions.").
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exclusively to the laundry list of section 522(d). This issue has been most
frequentl considered in cases involving the constitutionality of state actions
which manifest an attempt to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of
section 522() since, like section 522(m), there is no opt-out provision from
this subsection. Courts that have confronted the issue have consistently
held that "Congress never intended for the state to have the power to opt
out of. . .[section] 522(f)(2) despite the grant of authority to states to de-
termine the amount of exemptions which they would allow."' 0 3 As stated
in Curry v. Associates Financial Services:'° 4
While the states are permitted not to authorize the federal
exemptions but instead make the state exemptions available in
bankruptcy proceedings, Congress did not permit the states to ex-
ercise any discretion over lien avoidance. Lien avoidance was a
congressional response to what was perceived as a nationwide
problem. Dragnet security interests in household goods and per-
sonal property seriously threatened the rehabilitation of the bank-
rupt and therefore one of the overriding goals of federal
bankruptcy law.'
0 5
In the same light, Congress intentionally enacted section 522(m) to allow
each debtor the right to elect exemptions regardless of whether the debtor
files in a joint case or is a partial owner of a homestead with another debtor.
In other words, Congress intended that husband and wife debtors each
should be entitled to all exemptions, regardless of whether they maintain
the same residence and regardless of whether a state has opted out of the
federal exemptions.
It is arguable that the Missouri statute is not inconsistent with section
522(m), as it does not specifically preclude both debtors in ajoint case from
using the homestead exemption. Rather, the Missouri statute provides that
if more than one owner claims a homestead exemption, the exemption al-
lowed to each owner shall not exceed, in the aggregate, the total exemption
allowed under the homestead exemption. Accordingly, although under the
technical wording of section 522(m), the Missouri statute permits each
debtor in a joint case to claim a homestead exemption, a husband and wife,
living together, are only entitled to one-ha/f the homestead exemption avail-
able to other debtors. This emasculates the spirit and intent of section
522(m) by denying a married debtor the same exemption as that available
to individual homeowners. Therefore, pursuant to the supremacy clause,
any conflict between the homestead exemption and section 522(m) must be
constitutionally resolved in favor of the federal law.106
103. In re Meadows, 9 Bankr. 882, 883 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
104. 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
105. Id. at 721.
106. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971).
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B.' Section 522() Lien Avoidance
One other aspect of the federal exemptions may cause some contro-
versy as the new Missouri opt-out statute is interpreted for the first time by
the courts. This involves the lien avoidance provision in section 522(o.
That section states:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid
the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the
extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if
such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in
any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing
apparel, applicances, books, animals, crops, musi-
cal instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the
trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of
the debtor;
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor. 107
The relevant legislative history and subsequent interpretation of this provi-
sion indicate a congressional concern with the protection of debtors from
creditors who threaten to repossess collateral which might be very impor-
tant to the debtor yet of little real value to the creditors. Faced with losing
his household goods, a debtor might be coerced into an unwise bargain reaf-
firming his debt rather than going to the expense of replacing such items.
On the other hand, the average creditor would have little or no use for such
items and would be primarily concerned with the leverage a lien on such
items would provide in negotiating with a typical debtor. Congress at-
tempted to prevent this situation from hampering a debtor's fresh start by
enacting section 522(o. 108
Notwithstanding the legal problems which can arise as courts deter-
mine the relationship between an opt-out statute and section 522(o, that
section has already been faced with a myriad of legal and constitutional
challenges."0 9 These issues are of direct interest only to practitioners in-
volved with section 522() and do not concern the primary subject matter of
this Article. However, the ultimate effect and validity of section 522() will
be significant in determining its interrelationship with other parts of state
107. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o (Supp. V 1981).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6079; see also In re Thurman, 20 Bankr. 978,
980 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
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opt-out statutes, and it is this interrelationship with which this Article is
primarily concerned.
The basic argument the courts face in interpreting state opt-out provi-
sions and the effect such provisions have on section 522( is, once again, a
supremacy argument. The question is whether a state can opt out of sec-
tion 522() as well as the federal exemptions. As one court stated: "The
question then must be whether in granting states the option to determine
which exemptions debtors of that state would use, Congress also intended to
permit state law to modify or pre-empt other substantive provisions of the
bankruptcy law."1 1 o Several courts have been persuaded that the answer to
that question, in light of the supremacy clause, is no.'' Other courts have
reached a different conclusion." 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit tentatively adopted the latter position in In re McManus,1 13
an appeal from a decision denying a debtor's avoidance of a lien that fell
within the province of section 522(o. The Fifth Circuit examined the Loui-
siana opt-out statute" 4 and concluded that it had expressly defined mort-
gaged household goods and furnishings out of the list of exempt
property. 15 The court noted that section 522() permits lien avoidance
only to the "extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under" section 522(b)." 6 In light of the fact that
debtors, under section 522(b), were only entitled to those exemptions pro-
vided in the Louisiana opt-out statute, which specifically excluded mort-
gaged household goods and furnishings from the list of exempt property,
the court held: "The chattel mortgages the debtors in the cases sub judice
wish to avoid do not impair an exemption to which they would have been
entitled under section 522(b)."' 17 Consequently the security interests could
not be avoided under section 522(f). The court discussed the possibility
that a different result might occur if Louisiana law had not been so specific
110. In re Marinsky, 9 Bankr. 579, 582 (N.D. Ohio. 1981).
111. See In re Maddox, 27 Bankr. 592 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re McKelvey, 20
Bankr. 405 (D. Ariz. 1982); In re Strain, 16 Bankr. 797 (D. Idaho 1982); In re Fred-
rickson, 12 Bankr. 506 (D.S.D. 1981); In re Pine, 11 Bankr. 595 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In
re Meadows, 9 Bankr. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
112. See In re Foster, 16 Bankr. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1981). This decision was based
on reasoning very similar to that in McManus. See text accompanying notes 113-20
infia.
113. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982). On appeal, the case was consolidated with
another decision cancelling a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money lien on the basis
of section 522(o. Id. at 355.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881B (West 1980).
115. 681 F.2d at 357. The court cited LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. 13:3885 (West
1980), which provides that "a person who has granted a chattel mortgage on his
property. . . may not thereafter claim an exemption from the seizure of such mort-
gaged property for the enforcement of the mortgage."
116. 681 F.2d at 355.
117. Id. at 357.
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in defining such property, if subject to a mortgage, out of the list of exempt
property.118
The effect to be afforded future claims by debtors for lien avoidance in
Missouri based on section 522() is, at this time, unclear. The Missouri stat-
utes do not contain any provision differentiating between mortgaged and
non-mortgaged property such as the Fifth Circuit was confronted with in
McManus. Indeed, other than the statement in Missouri Revised Statutes
section 513.430 that "property shall be exempt from attachment and execu-
tion to the extent of any person Is interest therein," 119 the Missouri statutes do not
contain any provision which makes any type of statement about the possi-
ble future status of section 522(o. Without guidance from the legislature,
the continued effect of section 522(0 will be determined by the interpreta-
tion the courts place on the Missouri opt-out statute. It seems certain that
some creditor will contest the now somewhat routine procedure of lien
avoidance prevailing under section 522() in light of the new Missouri stat-
ute. What position the courts will adopt is uncertain, but the cases cited
herein show that conflicting modes of judicial interpretation have surfaced
in other courts. This consideration does not seem to be potentially as signif-
icant in Missouri as some of the other issues regarding state opt-out statutes
which have been discussed in this Article. It is, however, of importance to a
debtor faced with the loss of his household goods.
118. Id.
119. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.430 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
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